Shooting the War

The Germans concentrated their armour from the start in special armoured divisions comprising a balanced force of tanks, artillery, infantry, engineers, and administrative services. No consideration was given to the idea behind the French and British ‘infantry’ tanks and the doctrines associated with them. The tanks, supported by their own artillery and infantry, were to operate as a concentrated strategic force directed against the enemy’s weakest spots and well ahead of the main, slower, infantry army.
This tank army, trained as a team, consisting of ten armoured divisions by May 9, 1940, contained at all levels a wealth of experience. Many of its officers and men were members of tank units which fought on Franco’s side in the Spanish Civil War. Here they gained battle practice: they tested new techniques and the mechanical capabilities of their machines; and they saw the fate that befell tank forces that were put into battle dispersed in ‘penny packets’. Moreover, intensive peacetime exercises in Germany had been supplemented by the bloodless occupations of Austria in 1938 and Czechoslovakia in 1939. In rapid, long-distance thrusts through these countries, the armoured forces taught themselves essential administrative lessons without having actually to engage in combat.
In September 1939, when the fighting began, the administration worked well and the armoured divisions outfought the old-fashioned Polish army in a matter of days, showing that the quality of the highly specialised, mechanised forces was master of the quantity mustered by the larger, traditional conscript armies. It also confirmed what had been long understood: that the air arm, working in close cooperation with tanks, conferred a powerful element of heavy fire-support on forces operating deep in the enemy rear. The aircraft were in fact a substitute for heavy artillery.
Singers without song
Thus on May 9, 1940, the relative overall condition of the opposing armoured forces can be summarised as follows. The French, saddled with a technique that was 20 years out of date, and with machines operated by men who lacked experience of the pace and scope of modern battle conditions, were partnered by the British, whose techniques were far more up-to-date, but who were attempting to practise them with too few machines, and with a number of officers and men who had not yet had time to grasp the significance of their new role. Indeed, it was this lack of experience that most seriously bedevilled the fighting quality of the Allies. Their armoured formations, either through reasons of policy, doctrine, or lack of machines, had not practised together. Nor was there close co-operation with the air arm in the forefront of the land battle. So they were in fact singers without a song.
Fatally linked with their limited use of tanks was the failure of the Allied command to understand and make adequate strategic preparations to defeat the German attacks when they eventually came. There was a belief, sincerely held, despite warnings from men of practical experience, that some terrains were naturally tank-proof and others could be made secure by the erection of concrete and steel fortifications. It was thought that mechanised armies would not be able to pass through the narrow lanes, forests, and valleys of the Ardennes; that the Maginot Line would be impenetrable, and that the extensions of the Maginot Line along the Belgian frontier, certain inundations, and large built-up areas would also be serious obstacles to tank action.
Therefore the Allies made no elaborate plans for tank counterthrusts in the localities they had classified as tank-proof. The best, mobile armoured portions of the French army were not deployed in a manner permitting them to launch an immediate, concentrated counterstroke —even if their doctrine had envisaged such action. As we have seen, no such doctrine existed and as a result it was quite conceivable —even probable—that the light mechanised divisions and the new tank divisions could be flung in piecemeal (and therefore outnumbered) against superior enemy formations.
Their opponents, the Germans, lacked neither doctrine, equipment, training, nor experience. They were masters of a new war-winning technique that brought speed and mobility to the battlefield. By a combination of speed, thrust, and shock action they could bring a completely new momentum to the battle. The impact of the German armoured divisions could not be compared with that of the basically cavalry- and infantry-oriented methods of the Allies: they had in fact — with their range and striking power —introduced a new dimension to warfare.
Types of tank
Yet inevitably the balance of material was in favour of the Allies, who had more tanks than the Germans and many that were technically superior. In their ten armoured divisions the Germans had only 627 of the good Mark III and IV tanks, armed respectively with a 37-mm and a 75-mm gun, and protected by armour not more than 30-mm in thickness. The remaining 2,060 tanks were lightly armoured machines, mostly armed only with a 20-mm gun — although 381 of these were the sound Czech light T-38, equipped with a 37-mm gun. In addition to the 2,690 tanks with the armoured divisions, there were some 800 machines, mostly light ones, in reserve.
Against this array the French fielded about 3,000 machines, of which 500 were in units in the course of formation, plus older reserve machines. Of these 3,000 tanks, 1,292 were with the light mechanised divisions and the new tank divisions; the remainder were split up among the infantry armies. To this total should be added the British. On May 9 they had in France
210 light tanks in the light armoured regiments, and 100 ‘1′ tanks in the lst Army Tank Brigade. A further 174 light tanks and 156 of the new cruisers, belonging to the Armoured Division, were ready to cross the Channel as the battle started. Thus the Allies could oppose 3,000 German tanks with something like 3,600 of their own — if they chose.
On balance, the quality of the machines possessed by the two sides was about equal. The best French tank, the Char B, mounted the excellent 47-mm gun in a fully rotating turret and had a 75-mm gun mounted in the hull. The 20-ton Somua had a 47-mm gun, too, and was fast. The armour of these tanks was from 40 to 60 mm thick, compared with the best German armour of 30 mm. There were 800 of these new machines and even the older ones compared well with the German lighter vehicles. The 384 light British tanks were certain to be severely outclassed in a stand-up fight, because their guns could not penetrate armour, although their high speed and small size might serve them well when engaged on reconnaissance. But the 100 infantry tanks, of which 23 were the new Matilda, were covered by immensely thick armour (up to 70 mm) and quite safe from the fire of the German tank guns. And the 2-pounder gun, mounted in the thinner cruisers of the Armoured Division and also on the Matilda, was a weapon capable of penetrating any of the German machines at battle ranges.
But while the German and British machines (with one exception) were designed with two- or three-man turrets, the French machines had a single man in the turret confronted with the difficult task of commanding the vehicle, loading and firing the gun, and sometimes controlling the tactics of sub-units. The single British exception was the Mark I infantry tank, and this too presented terrible problems of combat efficiency and command.
This technical factor meant that the German and most of the British crews would be able to fight as teams within the all-embracing organisation of the armoured formations to which they belonged—but would also give the Germans an important advantage when their tank formations clashed with the French. This would make up for the fact that the majority of their tanks were vulnerable to the enemy tank guns, while their own guns would not penetrate the armour of a large proportion of the Allied tanks.
Leadership
The importance of personal command and direction is far more apparent to the fighting man in a climate of military opinion that insists that the generals should remain in the fore-front of the battle, in close touch with the leading tanks both visually and by radio. The Germans practised this method more than the Allies. The French kept their command posts further to the rear in accordance with the practice of 1918, and in any case did not possess a control system suited to high-speed combat. This fact, when combined with the separation of the tank-crew commander from the rest of his crew, would be liable to foster a drop in morale among the French tank units (there is evidence to support this —noted by British tank crews working alongside the French later in the campaign). It was clear, they said, that when faced by German tanks the French crews became cautious and were almost paralysed; and this exaggerated respect for the enemy was a result of the drubbing they had received in their first encounters with the German tanks. Even if the balance of morale between the contestants was equal on May 9, a week later the defects in organisation, leadership, and tactics had swung the scales irrevocably in favour of the Germans.
The overriding superiority of the Germans over the Allies was inherent in their intention to make use of well co-ordinated, massed, all-arms formations, launched into battle at the critical points, commanded by inspired men of vision and determination. Men of the stamp of Guderian and Reinhardt led the armoured corps from the van of the battle (with Rommel leading one of the divisions) — and this wealth of talent could not fail to overwhelm lesser men with old-fashioned ideas. For on the Allied side, none of the generals of 1940 had
•    deep knowledge of armoured warfare; with
•    startling lack of foresight, those men who had made a study of the subject had been distributed to positions where their talents lay unused. Martel commanded an infantry division; Broad, Pile, and Lindsay had been sent—some say deliberately—to posts unconnected with armoured warfare; and Hobart had been removed from the Active List, though he was ultimately to be recalled. De Gaulle was only just in the process of assembling a brand new and totally inexperienced tank division.
Let it be admitted that men such as these were not easy to live with. They had learned to be ruthless in the face of long-established tradition, that out-dated rules must be broken whatever the personal and immediate consequences, and that these circumstances applied in all armies. Men insufficiently imbued with spirit failed in the face of military ‘vested interests’; those who stood up to them but were unblessed by fortune were removed—as Hobart was; those who fought, and were lucky, followed their stars to success in war in the forefront of the armoured battle.
In 1940, it was the Germans whose spirit and good fortune had combined — and so they dominated. Most of the French armoured commanders were ineffective, and the grossly outnumbered British tank men could not, except on one outstanding occasion, make a decisive contribution.
In numbers the Allies were superior to the Germans; in quality of equipment they were, on balance, about equal; in strategic and tactical application, they were markedly inferior.
The sheer superiority of German armoured technique ensured the certainty of their victory before the frontiers were crossed.